Abstract-This paper asks whether scarcity increases violence in markets that lack a centralized authority. We construct a model in which, by raising prices, scarcity fosters violence. Guided by our model, we examine this effect in the Mexican cocaine trade. At a monthly frequency, scarcity created by cocaine seizures in Colombia, Mexico's main cocaine supplier, increases violence in Mexico. The effects are larger in municipalities near the United States, with multiple cartels and with strong support for PAN (the incumbent party). Between 2006 and 2009 the decline in cocaine supply from Colombia could account for 10% to 14% of the increase in violence in Mexico.
I. Introduction
A GENTS in illegal markets cannot rely on the rule of law. The state does not solve disputes, protect property rights, or enforce contracts. As in other environments without a centralized authority, agents use violence as a substitute for the institutions that a well-functioning state provides.
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Illegal drug markets in countries like Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan constitute major examples of environments where armed groups resort to ruthless violence in order to run the illegal trade, extract rents, and protect their revenue and assets.
We study the role of scarcity-or supply shortages-as a factor that exacerbates the use of violence in markets without a centralized authority. We do so in the context of the cocaine trade in Mexico. Starting in the late 1990s, Mexico became the main point of entry of drugs into the United States. The industry transformed into a vertical market with little integration, where powerful Mexican cartels purchase cocaine from producers in Colombia (and, to a lesser extent, Peru and Bolivia) and smuggle it across the U.S. border.
As figure 1 shows, since 2006, the expansion of the Mexican cocaine trade has coincided with a vast increase in violence, driven by clashes between cartels (drug trafficking organizations) and between cartels and Mexican authorities. In 2007, there were 8,686 homicides in Mexico, 2,760 of them drug related; in 2010, there were 25,329 homicides, 15,258 of them drug related. Between 2006 and 2009 there were 60,000 drug-related killings in Mexico, twice the death toll for Afghanistan between 2001 and 2011 (see Crawford, 2011) .
We ask whether the surge in drug-related violence in Mexico that started in 2006 is related to shortages in the supply of cocaine caused by larger and more frequent cocaine seizures in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government redefined its antidrug strategy, emphasizing the interdiction of drug shipments and the detection and destruction of cocaine processing labs over the eradication of coca crops. To motivate our analysis, we present a model of conflict in illegal markets where scarcity, driven by supply disruptions in upstream markets, fuels violence along trafficking countries. In our model, cartels use violence to dispute revenue and control over factors of production (e.g., routes, land). If demand for cocaine is inelastic, as evidence for illegal drugs suggests (Becker, Murphy, & Grossman, 2006) , exogenous supply reductions in upstream markets increase revenue. Rapacity over the additional money flowing into the cocaine trade triggers violence. Our model predicts that scarcity has a greater effect on violence in Mexican areas that are more important for trafficking, like those near the U.S. border, where there are at least two cartels, and where more frequent arrests and crackdowns against cartel leaders increase turnover, which precludes informal cooperation. Using monthly data for Mexico from December 2006 to December 2010, we then explore the relationship between scarcity and violence in the context of the Mexican cocaine trade. We use cocaine seizures in Colombia as an external source of scarcity. Although figure 1 shows that the rise of violence in Mexico since 2006 coincides with the sharp decline of the cocaine supply in 2006, this low-frequency correlation could simply reflect a change in policies in both countries, such as President Calderón's war on drugs in Mexico and the emphasis on interdiction policies in Colombia. To overcome this difficulty, we exploit monthly deviations in cocaine seizures in Colombia, obtained after flexibly removing time trends. Our empirical strategy investigates whether the scarcity generated by high-frequency changes in cocaine seizures in Colombia generates violence in Mexico and then asks which municipalities are affected the most. The key identifying assumption is that the monthly variation in seizures is exogenous to changes in enforcement in Mexico or unobserved changes in cocaine markets.
Our main finding is that during months with supply shortages caused by large cocaine seizures by Colombian authorities, violence increases in Mexico, especially in municipalities close to the U.S. border. The effect is stronger in municipalities with a cartel presence, but only when two or more cartels are contesting each other. The increase in violence is also larger in municipalities that have historically supported PAN, the governing party that spearheaded the crackdown on the cocaine trade between 2006 and 2012. Building theory of conflict in which cartels contest the cocaine trade revenue-a description we believe captures the main features of this market-can explain all of our empirical findings.
on Dell (2015) , our interpretation is that these municipalities were more supportive of federal government efforts to defeat cartels. As a consequence, cartel leaders were arrested, killed, or removed more frequently in these municipalities, precluding nonaggression treaties between cartels and exacerbating the effect of scarcity on violence.
According to our preferred estimates, a 10% increase in monthly cocaine seizures in Colombia raises homicides in Mexico by 0.59% to 0.91%. Under additional assumptions mentioned in the text, this means that the sharp decline in the cocaine supply from Colombia between 2006 and 2009 (from 520 to 200 metric tons per year) accounts for 10% to 14% of the increase in the homicide rate in Mexico during this period and for 25% of the differential increase in violence observed in the north of Mexico relative to the rest of the country.
Our paper relates to three strands of literature. The first is the literature on conflict over resources. Our model builds on the economic theory of conflict (Grossman, 1991 (Grossman, , 2001 Hirshleifer, 2001 ). An increase in the value of the contested resources has an ambiguous effect on violence. On the one hand, rapacity over the additional resources-the temptation to prey on others and the need to defend against predatorsleads to more violence (Skaperdas, 2002; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) . On the other hand, resource booms may also increase wages and, hence, the opportunity cost of engaging in violence (see Becker, 1968; Grossman, 1991; Dal Bó & Dal Bó, 2011) . 5 We contribute to this literature by showing that U n c o r r e c t e d P r o o f SCARCITY WITHOUT LEVIATHAN 3 rapacity dominates in the Mexican cocaine trade: higher revenues from cocaine increase violence, especially in areas contested by multiple cartels. This adds to the empirical literature that finds a link between resource booms and violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Buonanno et al., 2015; Couttenier, Grosjean, & Sangnier, 2017; Dube & Vargas, 2013) , as well as the theoretical literature that emphasizes the role of the number of contenders (Kalyvas, 2006) . Our paper also contributes to the literature on violence in illegal markets (Goldstein, 1985) . Our model relates to works that analyze the motivations behind violence between the state and cartels (Lessing, 2015) and between competing cartels (Castillo & Kronick, 2018) . On the empirical side, our finding that higher revenues lead to more drug-related violence in the Mexican cocaine market is consistent with results by Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Mejía and Restrepo (2013) , who find that the rise of the cocaine trade spurred violence in Colombia. (Lind, Moene, & Willumsen, 2014, show evidence for a causal link in the opposite direction for opium cultivation in Afghanistan.).
Finally, our work contributes to the debate about the causes of the upsurge in violence in Mexico since 2006. Some observers blame the upsurge on the struggle for power created by the policies implemented by Calderón, who in 2006 started an aggressive strategy of beheading cartels by killing or arresting their leaders (Guerrero, 2010; Merino, 2011) .
6 Using a regression discontinuity design, Dell (2015) finds a significant increase in antidrug crackdowns in municipalities in which PAN, Calderón's party, won local elections. Crackdowns are followed by a spike in drug-related violence. Similarly, Calderón et al. (2015) , who compare the area of influence of a cartel with a synthetic control group, find that the killing of a cartel leader raises violence. 7 We emphasize the role of policy changes in Colombia. The dramatic increase in cocaine seizures in Colombia since 2006 has created large and frequent shortages in downstream cocaine markets, which has translated into more frequent and larger surges of violence in Mexico. This is not to say that PAN and Calderón's policies had no effect; indeed, our evidence suggests that Colombian policies and the Mexican policies interacted to cause large increases in violence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our model and discusses its testable predictions. Section III describes our data, empirical strategy, and results. Section IV concludes.
intensive commodities like coffee may actually reduce violence (see Dube & Vargas, 2013) . 6 Other observers have defended this strategy, arguing that reducing cartel entry could decrease violence in the long term (Poiré & Martínez, 2011; Villalobos, 2012) . 7 Two recent papers shift the focus away from Calderón's policies. Dube, García-Ponce, and Thom (2016) show that negative agricultural shocks facilitated the rise of the Mexican drug sector and, thus, increased violence. Dube, Dube, and García-Ponce (2013) 
II. A Model of Scarcity and Violence
Our model features cartels that operate in a transit country (Mexico) and buy cocaine in upstream markets (Colombia) to traffic to a downstream market (the United States). The key feature of our model is that cartels fight over the control of the cocaine trade and the revenue it commands. In particular, cartels fight for the control of municipalities, some of which are strategically more important and thus account for a larger share of total cocaine revenue.
When total revenue increases, as a consequence of scarcity spurred by cocaine seizures in Colombia, rapacity over the additional resources fuels violence. Rapacity is more severe in municipalities that are important for the cocaine trade and command a larger share of the trade revenue and in municipalities contested by multiple cartels.
We then introduce a dynamic version of the model where cartels take into account the threat of retaliation when they are fighting over revenue. This extension shows that transitory increases in revenue have a strong effect on violence because they increase the benefits of one-shot deviation while having a limited impact on the future value of cooperation. Policies that make cartel leaders more impatient, such as an increase in arrest rates, make deviations more attractive and cause violence to be more responsive to spikes in revenue.
We discuss the connection between this model and our empirics at the end of this section.
A. Static Setting
Let Q s be the quantity of cocaine supplied by upstream countries like Colombia, which we assume is exogenous and determined by supply-reduction policies in these countries. There are N Mexican cartels, indexed by c ∈ C = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each cartel buys an amount Q s c of cocaine at a price P s and traffics it to downstream markets at a cost C(Q s c ), which is increasing, convex, and satisfies lim Q→0 C (Q) = ∞ and lim Q→∞ C (Q) = 0. We abstract from seizures by Mexican authorities, which implies that cocaine trafficked is given by c Q s c = Q s . Cartels then sell cocaine in the downstream market at a price P d (Q s ), which they take as given. 8 When deriving our results, we allow demand, P d (Q s ), to have any price elasticity. However, as we discuss in section IIC, evidence from related markets suggests that demand for cocaine traded through Mexican is inelastic.
The Mexican cocaine trade generates a total revenue
Our key assumption is that because there are no formal property rights in the cocaine market, revenue is unsecured and must be disputed with other cartels. In particular, a cartel is only entitled to a share ηQ revenue it generates, leaving a share of total revenue equal to (1 − η)R(Q s ) to be contested among cartels. Thus, η measures the extent to which a centralized authority can credibly protect property rights.
We formalize the dispute over the unsecured revenue as a dispute over municipalities, the control of which allows cartels to capture more of the cocaine revenue. In particular, we assume there are I municipalities, indexed by i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , I}. We denote by I c ⊂ I the subset of municipalities where a cartel operates and let N i ⊂ C be the set of cartels that operate in municipality i. Municipalities are heterogeneous in how relevant they are for the total cocaine trade. For instance, municipalities close to the United States or located along strategic routes have a greater importance, which allows cartels that control these areas to obtain a larger share of the disputed cocaine trade revenue. We model this heterogeneity by assuming that in municipality i, a fixed share s i ≥ 0 of the total revenue from the cocaine trade is disputed, with the understanding that i∈I s i = 1. An alternative interpretation of s i is that trafficking requires inputs, such as routes and land, that cannot be traded in regular markets and therefore must be contested. Parameter s i then captures the share of revenue accruing to the cartel that controls the inputs available in municipality i.
To appropriate or defend the unsecured revenue (1 − η)s i R(Q s ) in municipality i, the cartels that operate in it engage in violent conflict. We model the dispute over revenues with a contest success function (Skaperdas, 2002) . Cartels in N i simultaneously decide amounts g c,i ≥ 0 to invest in weapons or soldiers in municipality i. As a result, cartel c is able to obtain a fraction q c,i of the total revenue contested in municipality i, where
This contest success function represents all the strategies by which cartels appropriate and extract drug rents. For instance, they can act as toll collectors and extort payments from other cartels operating in municipality i; they can fight for turf in order to use routes and labor for their trafficking activities; they can prey on one another by violently stealing cash, weapons, assets, or other resources; or they may eliminate competition in key municipalities to increase their market share. The aggregate level of drug-related violence in municipality i is therefore linked to the total expense in the local conflict by all cartels, v i = c∈N i g c,i . Our assumptions imply that a Cartel's profits are then given by
The online appendix characterizes the full equilibrium of this market (including cartels' choice of quantities 
The online appendix shows that the unique Nash equilibrium of the conflict among cartels operating in municipality i results in a level of violence
This expression leads to our main proposition. 9 One implicit assumption behind this feature is that there is no risk sharing between Mexican cartels and suppliers in Colombia. We believe that the absence of a centralized authority precludes the possibility of this kind of vertical relations. If cartels and suppliers were able to enforce complex contracts, cartel payments to suppliers could be conditioned on the municipalities that they control, which implies that profits (revenue net of payments to Colombian suppliers), and not revenue, would determine the incentives to fight over a municipality. Even if this were the case, profits and violence would still increase for a sufficiently inelastic demand, as Castillo and Kronick (2018) show. 10 The key simplifying assumption in our model is that conflict over municipalities determines only who owns the disputed revenue; it does not affect production and trafficking. In a more realistic and complicated model, each municipality could be endowed with inputs needed for drug trafficking, and cartels would be able to use the inputs only in the municipalities they control. This would result in more complicated strategic considerations because now, the value of controlling a municipality would depend on who controls all other municipalities, and investments to control different municipalities could be strategic substitutes or complements. Modeling these considerations is beyond the scope of our paper.
11 This expression also helps us clarify which type of scarcity generates violence. Antidrug policies in municipality i displace the cocaine trade and reduce s i . From the perspective of municipality i, such a policy creates a scarcity of cocaine in that municipality and could reduce violence. As this example illustrates, it is the aggregate level of scarcity, which raises prices and revenue, that generates violence. The displacement of production from one municipality to another only reallocates violence. The main result in proposition 1 echoes a general finding in the conflict literature: when the value of contested resources increases, agents are encouraged to invest more in conflict, which ends up fueling violence. This prediction is quite general and applies to the unique symmetric equilibrium obtained when the contest success function is symmetric, homogeneous of degree 0, and has decreasing marginal returns (e.g., all ratio contest success functions described in Hirshleifer, 1989) . The same comparative statics apply to the equilibrium with the least and the largest levels of violence when we use a generic contest success function such that investments in the conflict by different cartels are strategic complements.
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B. Dynamic Setting
We now move to a dynamic setup based on Castillo and Kronick (2018) . 13 The dynamic analysis highlights two key points. First, supply shocks have an effect on violence, particularly if they are short-lived shocks like the ones we focus on in our empirical analysis. Second, beheading cartels by arresting or killing their leaders reduces the importance of retaliation, which makes violence more responsive to current scarcity.
The game described above is played out repeatedly, with an independent draw of Q s t in each period. Subscript t denotes time. At the end of each period, a cartel leader in municipality i is arrested or killed with probability a i and is then replaced by a new one. Leaders maximize cartel profits at their own discount rate (1 − a i )β, not at the market rate β. Arrests and killings thus make cartel leaders more impatient. 14 Just as in the static problem, the amount paid for drugs, the cost of smuggling drugs, and the revenues not subject 12 One can also construct examples where the logic of parts 1 and 2 of proposition 1 fails. For example, investment by one party could dissuade others from investing in the conflict, making investments by different cartels strategic substitutes. In this case, an increase in the value of the contested resources could lead one cartel to increase its investment, which might then induce a larger decrease in other cartels' investment. These forces are stronger in asymmetric equilibria where one party has a greater exante chance of winning the conflict and can effectively dissuade the other parties from investing. Thus, this dissuasion mechanism could be at play in municipalities that are under the effective control of a single cartel, but is less likely to apply to municipalities contested by multiple cartels, where we expect conflict to increase with scarcity. We explore this possibility, which relates to part C of proposition 1, in our empirical exercise. 13 Castillo and Kronick (2018) build a richer model of violence between criminal groups and analyze the effects of different government policies on supply and violence. Dynamic interaction opens the possibility of more favorable equilibria under the threat of retaliation (see Abreu, Pearce, & Stacchetti, 1990) .
14 This assumes that once a cartel leader is arrested or killed, the next leader cannot credibly compensate him for long-term investments. This could stem from the lack of enforceable contracts in environments without a centralized authority.
to appropriation are bygones. Also, revenue R(Q s t ) is fully determined by the realizations of Q s t . Thus, in each period, cartel c operating in municipality i chooses g c,i,t in order to maximize expected payoffs (excluding bygones):
Let g N (Q s ) be investment in the conflict in the symmetric static Nash equilibrium in municipality i when supply is Q s , which is the solution to the static model above. We focus on a recursive equilibrium where all cartels in municipality i spend
) and revert to g N (Q s ) as punishment if anyone deviates. This is not the most cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), but it provides a simple way to illustrate how informal cooperation arrangements work. The following proposition characterizes this equilibrium: Proof. See the online appendix.
the equilibrium that sustains the most cooperation under Nash reversion is recursive and has g c
We now explain the results for the empirically relevant case, when demand is inelastic. The proposition shows that in the absence of a centralized authority, there is room for some de facto protection of property rights, sustained by the threat of future retaliation. Item a in proposition 2 shows that if a i is low and β is high, an equilibrium with no violence can be sustained-a folk theorem. As the effective discount rate decreases, participants value the future less and some level of violence must be allowed, especially when revenues are large.
Part b in proposition 2 shows that when violence occurs, temporary reductions in supply Q s increase violence for two reasons. First, they increase current revenues and, hence, the incentives to prey. Second, because of reversion to the mean, expected revenues in the future are lower, which means that the treat of retaliation is a less effective means of preventing violence (see Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986) . The second 15 Our proof in the online appendix shows that similar results hold if the assumptions that R(Q s t ) is unbounded above and converges to 0 as Q s t increases are relaxed. 16 For a, there exists some finite THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS effect implies that short-lived supply shocks are particularly prone to generating violence. Also, the second effect becomes stronger when the arrest rate is high, which explains why the function g C (a i , Q s ) has a negative cross-partial derivative: not only is expected revenue in the future low, but cartel leaders heavily discount the threat of future retaliation when they are likely to get arrested. The effect of scarcity (in particular, short-lived shocks) on violence is thus stronger when arrest rates are high.
C. Empirical Predictions
In our empirical exercises, we test the implications of our model when the demand for cocaine is inelastic, as suggested by the empirical evidence. Becker et al. (2006) summarize these results and conclude that it is consistent with an elasticity of demand of less than 1 for most drugs, with a central tendency toward 1/2, especially over the short term.
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The basic story that emerges from the model is that scarcity generated by temporary and large cocaine seizures in Colombia-of the type that we explore in our empirical analysis-fosters violence in Mexico. Also, violence increases more in places that are more relevant for the drug trade (where s i is higher). In our empirical application, we focus on distance from the United States as a measure of s i . Since the goal of cartels is to take drugs across the border, places that are close to the United States are of strategic importance and thus command a larger share of the drug trade. Consequently, the violence spikes caused by cocaine seizures in Colombia should be stronger close to the U.S. border.
Our model also predicts differential effects depending on the number of cartels present in a municipality. Because violence results from disputes among cartels, our model suggests that scarcity raises violence only in municipalities contested by two or more cartels; there should be no effect in municipalities controlled by a single cartel or where no cartels operate. Finally, our model suggests that supply shortages generate more violence in municipalities where cartel leaders are killed or arrested more frequently. As Dell (2015) showed, crackdowns against the cocaine trade were more recurrent in municipalities that elected PAN mayors because the policies of Calderón and PAN, beheading cartels by killing or arresting their leaders, required the cooperation of local authorities. Thus, we expect supply shortages to have a larger impact on cartel violence in municipalities in which there is 17 The relevant value in our model is the short-run elasticity of demand, which is smaller than that over the long run (see Becker & Murphy, 1988) . Early papers found inelastic demands for marijuana and heroin (Nisbet & Vakil, 1972; Roumasset & Hadreas, 1977; Silverman & Spruill, 1977) . Wasserman et al. (1991) and Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) find demand elasticities between −0.4 and −0.75 for cigarette consumption over the short term. In the case of cocaine, the results of more recent studies are consistent with an inelastic demand as well. See, for instance, Bachman, Johnston, and O'Malley (1990) , DiNardo (1993) and Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) . a strong PAN support, which are more likely to elect PAN mayors and support their federal antidrug policies.
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Proposition 2 also suggests that higher levels of violence should be observed when the government's main strategy is to behead or arrest cartel leaders, as was the case during Calderón's term. We do not test this prediction because we focus on the role of scarcity and how it interacted with Mexican policies. However, Calderón et al. (2015) find empirical support for this prediction.
III. Data and Evidence on the Role of Scarcity
We focus on December 2006 to December 2010, for which drug-related homicide data are available. This coincides with the period of violence and intense cartel activity in Mexico known as the Mexican Drug War.
We use a monthly panel of all 2,457 Mexican municipalities (including the sixteen boroughs of Mexico City). Our dependent variables are different measures of the monthly homicide rate in each municipality. Our main variable of interest is the monthly homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants from INEGI (Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía), which includes all reported homicides. We also use data on drug-related homicides published by the Mexican presidency, which counts only homicides related to the illegal drug trade. This data set further classifies homicides into (a) assassinations of cartel members, which involve targeted killings of cartel members by competing cartels; (b) confrontation deaths, which are the result of battles between competing cartels or between cartels and government authorities; and (c) assassinations of government officials, which are the result of cartels' attacking government forces. 19 We explore the effect of scarcity on violence and how it is mediated by the relative importance of trafficking, the number of cartels, and the political power of the PAN party. We use proximity to the U.S. border as our proxy for trafficking importance. We compute it as the geodesic distance from the centroid of each municipality to the closest U.S. entry point. Using the data from Coscia and Ríos (2012), we construct dummies for the presence of cartels in all municipalities and for the presence of at least two cartels. 20 Finally, in order to explore heterogeneity with respect to PAN political power, we 18 A simple cross-sectional regression shows that a 10% increase in the historical PAN vote share increases the likelihood of electing a PAN mayor during our period of analysis by 7.4%. Also, incumbents in these places may be under more pressure from their electorate to cooperate with PAN's national policies. 19 Although it comes from an official source, the classification of homicides as drug related and into additional categories has been criticized (Hope, 2012) . Because of these concerns, we use the INEGI homicide rate as our main variable of interest. 20 Their data code whether every major cartel operated in a given municipality. The cartels are Cartel de los Hermanos Beltrán Leyva, Familia Michoacana, Cartel del Golfo, Cartel de Juárez, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Tijuana, and Los Zetas. We also obtained similar results if we focus on municipalities contested by rival cartels (instead of simply looking at municipalities that have multiple cartels), which are defined using the alliances described by Guerrero (2011 The table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in our empirical exercises. The data are presented separately for municipalities in all Mexico, in the first two distance quintiles to entry points in the United States, and in the first distance quintile to entry points in the United States. Standard deviations for each variable are reported below the corresponding mean in brackets.
compute the average voting share for PAN candidates in municipal elections from 1980 to 2000. For institutional reasons, this measure is available for only 1,998 of the municipalities in our sample. Table 1 summarizes our data. It presents statistics for all of Mexico (where the average distance from the United States is 763 km), for municipalities in the two quintiles closest to the United States (average distance 507 km), and for municipalities in the closest quintile (average distance 333 km). The Mexican population is concentrated in the north: the first quintile includes 25% of the national population, and the second quintile includes 35%.
While homicide rates were similar across Mexico in 2006, the north of Mexico (quintiles 1 and 2) became more violent subsequently than other parts of the country subsequently, a difference driven by a large increase in drug-related homicides. Consistent with the intuition that the north of Mexico is more important for cocaine trafficking, the data show that the vast majority of homicides in the north are drug related, whereas homicides in other areas of the country are less so. There is also more cartel activity in quintiles 1 and 2 than in the country as a whole. In 2010, cartels were active in 40% of the municipalities in the first two distance quintiles compared to 29% of all Mexican municipalities. Finally, northern municipalities are slightly more supportive of PAN, but these differences are not significant.
Our variation in scarcity comes from the vast monthly changes in cocaine seizures by Colombian authorities. 21 The data on cocaine seizures come from the Colombian Ministry of Defense. Figure A1 in the online appendix presents the monthly series for seizures of cocaine in Colombia and the homicide rate in Mexico.
A. Time Series Evidence
We start by providing evidence consistent with the main prediction in proposition 1: that violence increases in Mexico when cocaine becomes scarce due to cocaine seizures in Colombia. We study the time series effect of supply shocks by estimating the model
21 We also constructed a series for the monthly cocaine supply net of seizures in Colombia, and we use it directly as a measure of the supply of drugs reaching Mexico. However, this methodology requires interpolating annual production figures (there is no information on monthly production). Because our estimates exploit only high-frequency changes, the variation that we exploit in this alternative exercise is fully driven by changes in seizures, and the obtained results are very similar to the ones reported here. 
The table presents estimates of the effect of cocaine seizures in Colombia on violence in different groups of municipalities in Mexico. The dependent variable is the log of the homicide rate indicated in each panel, aggregated at the monthly level. The explanatory variable is the log of the monthly cocaine seizures in Colombia. We estimate the model for all 49 months from December 2006 to December 2010. All models include a cubic polynomial in time (months) and year dummies, so that only high-frequency variation is exploited. Columns 1 to 3 present estimates for Mexico as a whole; columns 4 to 6 for quintiles 1 and 2, and columns 7 to 9 for the first quintile. Columns 2, 5, and 8 add the monthly unemployment rate and a measure of economic activity as controls. Columns 3, 6, and 9 control for the rainy and hurricane season in Mexico. Standard errors robust against heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level.
Time runs at the monthly frequency from December 2006 (t = 0) to December 2010 (t = 48). h t is the homicide rate in Mexico, and S t are cocaine seizures in Colombia. The term F t (γ) = 3 n=0 γ n t n + η y includes both a cubic polynomial in time and year dummies to control flexibly for time trends; it absorbs low-frequency relations or secular trends that could confound our estimates, such as the upward trend in seizures in Colombia and crackdowns in Mexico that started in 2006 with President Calderón. Finally, ε t is an error term. Our standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, but we assume there is no serial correlation. 22 We interpret β as the effect of supply reductions in Colombia on violence in Mexico, which, according to our model, should be positive if demand is inelastic. The effect of cocaine seizures is identified from its high-frequency variation, which we treat as an exogenous shock to supply, Q s . The variation is considerable. The standard deviation in monthly seizures is 8 metric tons, which is high relative to the 40 metric tons of 22 The online appendix shows no serial correlation in the high-frequency variation in homicides or seizures and that both series are stationary. This justifies the use of standard inference and allows us to abstract from more complicated dynamics in our models.
cocaine that Colombia produced per month during the period we analyze. Thus, changes in Colombian seizures produce significant shortages of cocaine in downstream markets. We believe that this monthly variation is determined mostly by chance-for instance, by whether an interdiction operation is successful or unsuccessful and by factors like politics or funding in Colombia that are exogenous to Mexico. We maintain this assumption throughout and discuss some potential challenges to our interpretation after presenting our results.
We present estimates of equation (3) in table 2. Each panel has a different dependent variable. In columns 1 to 3, we focus on the homicide rate in all Mexican municipalities. In columns 4 to 6, we focus on the homicide rate in municipalities in quintiles 1 and 2 of proximity to the United States, and in columns 7 to 9, we focus on the homicide rate in municipalities in the first quintile of proximity to the United States.
Our estimates in columns 1, 4, and 7 of the top panel suggest that a 10% increase in monthly seizures in Colombia raises homicides in Mexico by 0.59% (standard error = 0.27%), 0.82% in municipalities in quintiles 1 and 2 (SE = 0.33%), and 1.19% in municipalities in the first quintile (SE = 0.33%). In the remaining panels, we document a larger increase in drug-related homicides, which is driven by U n c o r r e c t e d assassinations of cartel members and confrontation deaths (though the effect on confrontation deaths is not precisely estimated). We do not find any effect on assassinations of government officials (the effect is small but imprecise), which we view as supportive of the emphasis on intercartel violence in our model. In columns 2, 5, and 8, we include two monthly controls for all of Mexico, the unemployment rate and the Índice Global de Actividad Económica (IGAE), which is a measure of economic activity. Although these controls might be endogenous and we prefer our estimates without them, it is reassuring to see that our estimates do not change with their inclusion. Finally, in columns 3, 6, and 9, we control for Mexican weather seasons, which include a dummy for months in the rainy season and dummies for months in the hurricane season. Although our estimates are less precisely estimated in these cases, the point estimates remain roughly unchanged. These exercises suggest that the estimated effects are not driven by the Mexican business cycle or by seasonality. 23 We also illustrate the response of violence to supply shocks using event-study figures. We estimate equation (3) including six lags and six leads of ln S t . Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients for the homicide rate in all of Mexico, the homicide rate in the first two quintiles of proximity to the United 23 In table A2 of the online appendix, we explore variants of equation (3) with lags of the homicide rate as explanatory variables. These lags are not significant and do not affect the estimate of our coefficient of interest. We then explore the timing of the effects by adding lags and leads of seizures in Colombia. Contemporary seizures in Colombia have the strongest effect on violence. The effect vanishes quickly, lasting only an additional month in some specifications. We do not find any significant effect of future cocaine seizures in Colombia on Mexican violence.
States, and the first quintile. The homicide rate spikes during a cocaine shortage and then reverts back to its preshock level with some small persistence (although individual coefficients are less precisely estimated in this exercise). As in table 2, this pattern becomes starker in the north of Mexico.
To illustrate the quantitative implications of our estimates, we compute the effect of the sharp reduction in the Colombian supply of cocaine from 2006 to 2009 on violence in Mexico. Our calculation requires two assumptions. First, we assume that short-run shocks and persistent supply shocks have the same effect on violence.
24 Second, we assume that seizures in Colombia affect violence only through their effect on the net Colombian supply of drugs-an exclusion restriction. Both assumptions imply that β is the effect of a persistent reduction in the supply of Colombian cocaine by 1%.
Between 2006 and 2009, the cocaine supply from Colombia fell by 95.6 log points (from 520 to 200 metric tons). Most of the reduction was triggered by an increase in seizures, although coca cultivation and potential cocaine production also fell. We use the results in columns 1, 4, and 7 in the top panel of dynamics of the homicide rate. Our estimates imply that the reduction in cocaine supply increased the homicide rate by 5.6 to 8.7 log points in all of Mexico, which corresponds to about 10% to 15% of the increase experienced during this period. They also imply that scarcity in Colombia increased the homicide rate in quintiles 1 and 2 of Mexico by 7.8 to 10.1 log points and by 11.37 to 15.4 log points in the first quintile of proximity to the United States, which also accounts for 10% to 15% of the increase in violence during this period in both regions.
B. Heterogeneity by Proximity to the United States
We now investigate the prediction in proposition 1 that the effect of cocaine shortages on Mexican violence is greater in municipalities that are more important for the cocaine trade. We use distance from U.S. entry points as a proxy for a municipality's importance for trafficking. We do this because cocaine, unlike heroin or cannabis, is not produced in Mexico, and internal consumption of cocaine in Mexico is minor when compared to revenue from exports to the United States (see Kilmer et al., 2010) . Thus, municipalities close to the U.S. border have a major strategic advantage in trafficking. As shown in table 1, drug-related violence and cartel presence are concentrated in the north of Mexico, which suggests that these are the places that command a greater share of the drug trade.
To illustrate the heterogeneity in the response to seizures in Colombia as a function of distance to the United States, we estimate time series equation (3) for groups of municipalities in 901 moving windows of distance to the United States, each one of which comprises 10% of the municipalities. Figure 3 plots the estimated effects. Near the U.S. border, a 10% increase in cocaine seizures causes a 1.6% increase in violence. The effect vanishes gradually as we move away from the U.S. frontier; in the south of Mexico, for example, cocaine shortages have no impact on violence.
We next examine the evidence in more detail using a regression framework. Let p i denote proximity to the U.S. borderthe negative distance in kilometers from municipality i to the U.S. nearest entry point. We are interested in explaining the homicide rate in municipality i during month t, h i,t , as a function of municipality fixed effects, time effects, and the interaction between proximity to the United States and cocaine seizures in Colombia p i × ln S t .
We present two types of estimates. First, we estimate a Poisson fixed-effects model as in Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) and Wooldridge (1999) , which assumes the following conditional expectation for the homicide rate:
U n c o r r e c t e d
P r o o f SCARCITY WITHOUT LEVIATHAN 11
Second, we estimate the following simpler linear model,
where the left-hand side is a monotone transformation of the homicide rate that deals with the large dispersion in homicide rates and is well defined at 0. The constant r > 0 is the 90th percentile of the homicide rate in our sample. We choose this particular value for r because the estimated residuals resemble a normal distribution, suggesting that the transformation adequately removes the skewness of homicide rates. 26 The transformed value is approximately equal to
ln h i,t ; thus, the estimates can be interpreted as elasticities after multiplying them by the sample average of
. To ease the interpretation of our findings, we report estimates obtained after this normalization.
In both models, the dummies α t control for monthly changes that are common across Mexico and δ i control for municipality invariant characteristics. The term p i × F t (γ) flexibly controls for differential trends in violence in the north of Mexico (recall that F t [γ] includes a cubic polynomial in time and year dummies). Finally, β captures the additional impact of cocaine seizures in Colombia on violence in municipalities that are located 100 km closer to the U.S. border. This effect is identified by comparing how high-frequency changes in cocaine seizures by Colombian authorities relate to spikes or dips in violence in Mexican municipalities at different proximities to the United States.
Regarding inference, we compute standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within municipalities over time. For the estimates presented in the main text, we assume there is no spatial correlation left in the error term, i,t . Time effects already take into account aggregate shocks, and although there may be correlated shocks, we believe that the differential trends by distance account for the bulk of the spatial correlation in violence. The online appendix shows that we obtain similar results when we compute standard errors for our estimates of equation (5) that allow for several forms of spatial correlation, as in Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 , and when we allow for correlated shocks (other than aggregate) across municipalities within a month and compute standard errors with two-way clustering by municipality and month, as in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) . Table 3 presents our results for municipalities in all of Mexico (columns 1 to 4) and for those in distance quintiles 1 and 2 (columns 5 to 8). The dependent variable in the top panel is the homicide rate. According to the Poisson estimates from column 1, being 100 km closer to the United States implies an additional 0.31% (SE = 0.11) increase in homicide rates in response to a 10% increase in seizures in Colombia.
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In column 2 (and the remaining even columns), we control for differential time trends in municipalities that have different levels of historical PAN support. These capture the stronger deployment of Calderón's antidrug policies in areas where the PAN had more political power. The inclusion of these controls does not change our results.
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In columns 3 and 4, we estimate the model in equation (5). Being 100 km closer to the United States implies an additional 0.14% (SE = 0.04) increase in the homicide rate in response to a 10% increase in seizures in Colombia. In columns 5 to 8, we estimate a larger interaction when we restrict the sample to municipalities in quintiles 1 and 2 of distance to the United States.
The second panel presents results using the drug-related homicide rate as the dependent variable. We find again that seizures in Colombia have a stronger effect on Mexican drugrelated violence as one moves closer to U.S. entry points. The bottom panels show that consistent with our time series results from table 2, the differential effect on drug-related homicides in the north of Mexico is driven by assassinations of cartel members and confrontation deaths. As before, we find no differential effects of scarcity on the assassination of government officials.
Our results indicate that scarcity created by seizures in Colombia contributed to the sharp increase in violence in the north of Mexico relative to the rest of the country. The estimate in column 5 of the top panel implies that scarcity created by Colombian policies from 2006 to 2009 could explain up to 31 log points of the differential increase in homicides in the north of Mexico relative to the average municipality. This corresponds to 25% of the 128 log point differential increase in violence in the north of Mexico during this period.
C. The Role of Cartels and Mexican Policies
In this section we investigate if the presence of cartels and Mexican antidrug policies exacerbates the negative consequences of scarcity in cocaine markets. For our analysis, we use the INEGI homicide rate as our preferred measure of violence.
We begin by estimating equation (3) separately for the homicide rate in municipalities with no cartels, one cartel, and at least two cartels. The top panel of figure 4 , constructed in the same way as figure 2, depicts the estimated change in the homicide rate in municipalities with different cartel presence following a 10% increase in cocaine seizures in Colombia. Differential trend by distance to U.S.
The table presents estimates of the interaction between cocaine seizures in Colombia (measured at the monthly level in logs) on violence in Mexican municipalities located at different proximities to U.S. entry points (measured in 100 km). The dependent variable is the log of the homicide rate indicated in each panel. All estimates include a full set of municipality and time fixed effects, as well as a differential cubic time trend by distance from U.S. entry points. Additional covariates are indicated at the bottom of the table. Columns 1 to 4 present estimates for all of Mexico. Columns 5 to 8 present estimates for the first two quintiles of distance to the US border. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 use a Poisson fixed-effects model (the sample is the set of municipalities with a positive number of homicides in at least one month), while columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 use a monotone transformation of the dependent variable, ln(p + x), with p the 90th percentile of x. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within municipalities are reported below each estimate in parentheses. Coefficients significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level.
have an effect on violence in Mexican municipalities with no cartel or only a single one. In contrast, at the time of the cocaine shortage, homicides spike in Mexican municipalities that have at least two cartels present.
We also estimate equation (3) for municipalities with a historical PAN vote share above and below 28%, which we refer to as high and low PAN support municipalities, respectively. The 28% threshold corresponds to the average PAN vote share in local elections between 1980 and 2000, but our results are robust to using different thresholds. The bottom panel of figure 4 depicts the estimated change over time in the homicide rate of municipalities with different PAN support following a 10% increase in cocaine seizures in Colombia. Scarcity has a small effect on violence in the sample of Mexican municipalities that have low PAN support, which is not significant. In contrast, we find that scarcity has a larger effect on violence in the sample of Mexican municipalities that have high PAN support (although the effect is not precisely estimated). Table 4 summarizes the results from figure 4. The left panel (columns 1 to 6) presents our time series estimates for the homicide rate in Mexican municipalities that have different numbers of cartels. The right panel (columns 7 to 10) presents our time series estimates for the homicide rate in Mexican municipalities that have different levels of historical PAN support. For each set of municipalities, indicated at the column headings, we present two estimates of equation (3): our baseline specification and one that controls for the dynamics of homicide rates by adding lags of the dependent variable (presented in the even columns).
To test whether the differences in the time series responses uncovered above are jointly significant, we estimate extensions of equations (4) and (5) that also allow cocaine seizures in Colombia to affect the homicide rate differently in Mexican municipalities that have none, one, or multiple cartels and in municipalities that have low or high historical PAN support. Let DTO iy be a vector of cartel presence variables in municipality i during year y, including a dummy for the presence of at least one cartel and a dummy for multiple cartels. Also, let PAN i be a dummy for high historical PAN support (defined as in Figure 4) . We estimate equations (4) and (5) by adding the interaction terms ln S t × DTO iy and ln S t × PAN i . To ensure that we only identify these interactions from the high-frequency variation in cocaine shortages, we also U n c o r r e c t e d include a full set of terms of the form DTO i,y × F t (γ 1 ), and PAN i × F t (γ 3 ), which control for time trends in municipalities with different numbers of cartels or in municipalities with different historical support for the PAN party. Columns 1 and 4 of table 5 present the results from this exercise. Columns 1 to 3 present Poisson estimates of equation (4), while columns 4 to 6 present OLS estimates of equation (5). The top panel presents results using all Mexican municipalities, while the bottom panel restricts the sample to those in the first two quintiles of distance to the United States.
The results in columns 1 and 4 show that cocaine shortages have a larger effect in municipalities in which there is high PAN support. For instance, the estimates in column 4 of the top panel show that a 10% increase in seizures in Colombia causes an additional increase in homicides of 0.36% in municipalities that have high PAN support relative to other municipalities. Although they are not precisely estimated, these coefficients also suggest that cocaine shortages cause a differential increase in violence only when there are at least two cartels operating in a municipality. These estimates are less precise in part because drug cartels locate in municipalities near the U.S. border (see table 1 ). As a consequence, it is hard to distinguish the effect of the interaction of scarcity with proximity to the U.S. border from its interaction with The table presents estimates of the effect of cocaine seizures in Colombia on the homicide rate for different groups of municipalities in Mexico. The dependent variable is the log of the homicide rate. The explanatory variable is the log of the monthly cocaine seizures in Colombia. We estimate the model for all 49 months from December 2006 to December 2010. All models include a cubic polynomial in time (months) and year dummies, so that only high-frequency variation is exploited. Each model is estimated for the subsample of municipalities in the group indicated on the top rows. Standard errors robust against heteroskedasticity are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level. The table presents estimates of the interaction between cocaine seizures in Colombia (measured at the monthly level in logs), proximity to U.S. entry points (measured in 100 km), cartel presence, and PAN support on violence in Mexican municipalities. The dependent variable is the log of the homicide rate. All estimates include a full set of municipality and time fixed effects, as well as a differential cubic time trend by distance from U.S. entry points, number of cartels, and PAN support. The top panel presents estimates for all of Mexico. The bottom panel presents estimates for quintiles 1 and 2. Columns 1 to 3 use a Poisson fixed-effects model (the sample is the set of municipalities with a positive number of homicides in at least one month), while columns 4 to 6 use a monotone transformation of the dependent variable, ln(p + x), with p the 90th percentile of x. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within municipalities are reported below each estimate in parentheses. Coefficients significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level. the presence of multiple cartels. The estimates in column 4 of the top panel show that a 10% increase in seizures in Colombia causes an additional increase in homicides of 0.47% in municipalities that have multiple cartels relative to other municipalities. In line with our model, we find no difference in the effect of scarcity between municipalities that have a single cartel and those that have none.
Our models in columns 1 and 4 estimate the interaction of cocaine shortages with cartel presence and PAN support for the average municipality. One limitation of this analysis is that conflict among cartels and PAN policies may play a more important role in municipalities near the United States, where the cocaine trade is booming. In fact, our model suggests there should be a triple interaction between shortages, proximity to the United States, and other factors that worsen the conflict among cartels.
To explore this possibility, we include in columns 2 and 5 triple interactions of the form ln S t × p i × DTO iy and ln S t × p i × PAN i , which allow us to test whether cartels and PAN policies had a differential effect in areas close to the U.S. border. 29 In columns 3 and 6, we control for ln S t × p 2 i to ensure that our triple interactions are not capturing nonlinearities in the relationship between scarcity and proximity to the U.S. border. To ease the interpretation of all these models, the main effects of the double interactions are now evaluated at border municipalities with multiple cartels and high PAN support.
In line with our model and the above conjecture, coefficients on triple interactions involving high PAN support and the presence of multiple cartels in columns 2 and 5 are all large and positive, and most of them are statistically significant (except for the triple interaction with high PAN support in column 2, which is not precisely estimated). These triple interactions are quantitatively important. To see this, we can go back to the double interactions between cocaine seizures in Colombia and cartel presence, which are now evaluated at border municipalities where the cocaine trade is booming. The estimates in column 5 of the top panel show that when we focus on municipalities at the U.S. border, a 10% increase in seizures in Colombia causes an additional increase in homicides of 2.42% in municipalities that have multiple cartels relative to those that have one or none. The fact that this estimate is five times larger than its counterpart in column 4 illustrates the quantitative importance of the triple interaction term for multiple cartels. The triple interaction term in column 5 indicates that the 2.42% gap narrows by 0.33% when we move 100 km farther away from the U.S. frontier, which implies that cartels had a more detrimental effect on the response of violence to scarcity in the north of Mexico. As before, the estimates in columns 2 and 5 show no differential effect of scarcity on violence in municipalities controlled by 29 To guarantee that we exploit the high-frequency variation in cocaine shortages and homicides only to identify these interactions, we also include a full set of differential time trends of the form
a single cartel (relative to municipalities that have no cartels) even in the very north of Mexico (the triple interaction term is a precisely estimated 0).
We can go back to the double interaction between cocaine seizures in Colombia and high PAN support, which are now evaluated at border municipalities. The estimates in column 5 of the top panel show that when we focus on municipalities at the U.S. border, a 10% increase in seizures in Colombia causes an additional 1.64% increase in homicides in municipalities that have high PAN support relative to those that have low support (about five times the corresponding estimate in column 4). The triple interaction term indicates that this 1.64% gap narrows by 0.19% as we get 100 km farther away from the U.S. frontier. This triple interaction indicates that PAN policies had a more detrimental effect on the response of violence to scarcity in the North of Mexico.
30
The interpretation that emerges from table 5 is that Calderón's policies exacerbated the negative consequences of supply shortages, but this happened mostly in areas near the U.S. border where the cocaine trade boomed. The evidence in this section supports the possibility that starting in 2006, Calderón's policies and the expansion of Mexican cartels provided a dangerous blend that amplified the response of violence in Mexico to cocaine shortages generated in Colombia. From 2006 to 2010, the percentage of municipalities that had multiple cartels increased from 5% to 17%. Before 2006, there were fewer and more isolated cartels, and informal arrangements among cartel leaders presumably kept violence and rapacity low or prevented them altogether. After 2006, the environment was very different: fragmented cartels contested multiple key locations, especially in the north of Mexico, and the policy of beheading cartel leaders may have fueled conflict and division among cartels. 31 Our model and evidence indicate that it is in this environment that the scarcity generated by Colombian antidrug policies contributed to the increase of violence in Mexico.
D. Is Scarcity (and the Price Effect It Brings)
the Right Channel?
We have documented that cocaine seizures in Colombia are associated with large spikes of violence in Mexico at a monthly frequency. We argue in our theoretical model that 30 To quantify these results, consider the case of two border municipalities near U.S. entry points with different historical levels of PAN support: Ciudad Juarez (Chihuahua) and Nueva Laredo (Tamaulipas). The historical voting for PAN in Ciudad Juarez was about 44%, and in Nueva Laredo, it was 14%. A reduction in the supply of cocaine of 95.6 log points (observed between 2006 and 2009), would cause a differential increase of 15 to 30 log points in homicides in Ciudad Juarez relative to Nueva Laredo (using the estimates in column 2 or 5 of the top panel). During this period, homicides fell in Nueva Laredo by 23.4 log points and increased in Ciudad Juarez by 236.9 log points. The interaction between the decline in the net supply of cocaine and greater PAN support in Ciudad Juarez may explain 5% to 10% of this change. 31 In line with this view, when we reestimate equation (3) this occurs through an increase in cocaine revenues, which take place as long as demand is inelastic. Our interpretation relies on three key assumptions. The first assumption is that cocaine seizures by Colombian authorities are associated with periods of scarcity in transit markets. This assumption would not hold if seizures were simply increasing during periods of high cocaine productivity in Colombia or high cocaine demand in downstream markets. In both cases, cocaine seizures would be associated with abundance, not scarcity.
We do not believe that these concerns confound our interpretation. As figure 5 shows, estimates of variants of equation (3) reveal no high-frequency relationship between seizures and other antidrug policies in Colombia. Seizures of chemical precursors, interdiction of solid inputs, and the destruction of cocaine labs do not increase during months in which the Colombian government seizes large quantities of cocaine. This finding suggests that the high-frequency variation in cocaine seizures in Colombia does not simply reflect changes in cocaine production (driven by demand or productivity). If that were the case, all measures of interdiction policies would respond together and would be correlated. 32 We also estimate a large and negative elasticity of cocaine seizures in Mexico with respect to high-frequency changes in cocaine seizures in Colombia. Although it is not precisely estimated, this elasticity is telling: a 10% increase in cocaine seizures in Colombia during one month reduces co-caine seizures in Mexico by 6.8% during the same month (SE = 4.6), an elasticity that roughly corresponds to the share of Andean cocaine supplied by Colombia. This finding suggests that during months when the supply of Colombian cocaine turns out to be lower than expected, Mexican cartels traffic less cocaine to the U.S. market. Cartels do not appear to offset the lack of Colombian cocaine by relying on stored drugs or cocaine from other suppliers like Peru and Bolivia. This highfrequency relationship is in line with the anecdotal evidence that suggests that once a kilogram of cocaine leaves Colombia, it takes Mexican cartels four to six weeks to smuggle it and sell it in the U.S. market (see Gaviria & Mejia, 2016) . Our estimates and the anecdotal evidence support the key assumption that even at a monthly frequency, cocaine seizures in Colombia disrupt the cocaine trade downstream and generate significant scarcity.
The second assumption is that any coincidence in timing between policies or market conditions in Mexico and Colombia breaks down at higher frequencies once we flexibly control for time trends. Otherwise changes in Mexican policies could confound our estimates. This assumption could fail if there were complementarities in enforcement or cooperation between authorities across countries. Likewise, changes in enforcement or market conditions in Mexico could raise the demand for Colombian cocaine and, hence, cocaine seizures in Colombia.
We do not believe such alternatives explain our findings. The timing of the estimated effects suggests that seizures in Colombia do not react to past violent upsurges in Mexico, which supports our view that seizures in Colombia are not driven by market conditions in Mexico. If antidrug policies U n c o r r e c t e d P r o o f SCARCITY WITHOUT LEVIATHAN 17 in Mexico drove up both violence in Mexico and the demand for Colombian cocaine, one would observe a positive correlation between seizures in both countries, but this is not present in the data. If anything, the opposite holds, as shown in figure 5 . Contrary to these alternative explanations, there is no correlation between high-frequency changes in seizures in Colombia and the seizure rate of cocaine in Mexico, nor is there any correlation with other antidrug policies in Mexico, such as heroin seizures.
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Additionally, the effects we uncovered are specific to municipalities that have two or more cartels and high PAN support. If market conditions in Mexico affected seizures in Colombia, one would also observe a spurious correlation between seizures in Colombia and violence in Mexican municipalities that have low PAN support. If there were complementarities in enforcement across countries, one would also observe a spurious correlation between seizures in Colombia and violence in Mexican municipalities that have a single cartel, and this would be so because operations against this cartel would also induce more seizures in Colombia. Thus, the heterogeneity of the effects we uncovered is consistent with the model, and it rules out other potential explanations of our findings.
The third and final key assumption is that cocaine shortages increase revenue, which is theoretically the case so long as demand for cocaine is inelastic (as the existing evidence suggests). Unfortunately, we cannot measure prices or the amount of cocaine revenue in Mexico on a monthly basis, and this precludes any direct test of this assumption. Instead, we provide some reality checks that suggest that cocaine shortages in Colombia seem to increase cocaine revenues downstream. Annual data from the DEA indicate that from 2007 to 2010, cocaine prices increased dramatically as the supply of Colombian cocaine declined. While net cocaine production in Colombia went down from about 520 metric tons per year in 2006 to about 200 metric tons in 2009, the wholesale price per pure gram of cocaine in the United States went from $40 to $68, and the retail price went from $114 to $180 (the appendix summarizes the available price data). 34 Taking into account net production from Peru and Bolivia, which increased from 340 metric tons to 390 metric tons, the total gross drug trade revenue measured using wholesale prices in the United States increased from $34 billion to $40 billion, a 15% increase. Using retail prices, we find that between 2006 and 2009, cocaine revenue increased from $98 billion to 106 billion, a 7% increase. These trends support the possibility that cartels face an inelastic demand. 33 We construct the cocaine seizure rate in Mexico as total seizures over the net supply of cocaine flowing out of Colombia. We interpolate annual production to obtain monthly estimates and subtract monthly seizures in Colombia to obtain an estimate of the cocaine flowing out of Colombia. 34 There are no reliable data on cocaine prices at higher frequencies. Although quarterly prices can be constructed using the raw STRIDE DEA data, some have expressed doubts about the quality of quarterly variation in these data (see Horowitz, 2001 ; Arkes et al., 2008) .
IV. Conclusion
Focusing on the case of the Mexican cocaine trade, this paper investigates the role of scarcity as a determinant of violence in markets without a centralized authority. A standard conflict model in which cartels dispute unprotected revenue suggests that scarcity increases violence if the demand for cocaine is inelastic. The increase in violence should be larger in municipalities that are more important for the cocaine trade, where two or more competing cartels are present and where, because of policies that lead to the arrest and killing of cartel leaders, cartels behave more shortsightedly and do not cooperate.
We explore the link between scarcity and violence using monthly data from Mexican municipalities from December 2006 to December 2010. In line with the predictions of our model, we find that scarcity generated by large and temporary increases in cocaine seizures in Colombia increased violence in Mexico, especially at locations close to U.S. entry points. Most of the effect was driven by municipalities that had at least two competing cartels; there were no effects in municipalities that had one cartel or none. Our evidence supports the view that President Calderón and the PAN's strategy of beheading cartels amplified the effect of scarcity in areas that had high PAN support.
Our results indicate that greater cocaine seizures in Colombia after 2006 raised prices and contributed to the increase in Mexican violence. The sharp decline in the supply of Colombian cocaine from 2006 to 2009 of 95.6 log points may account for 10% to 14% of the increase in Mexican violence during this period and 25% of the differential increase of violence in the north of Mexico. Our paper documents spillovers from antidrug policies that transcend national frontiers. By generating scarcity, antidrug policies in Latin American countries may be fostering violence-even if the burden is borne by other countries.
Throughout this paper, we have emphasized a particular mechanism that suggests that cartels use violence to secure the increases in revenue generated by scarcity. There remains the possibility that this is not the sole mechanism that explains our findings. For instance, when cocaine shortages occur, cartels might increase their efforts in an attempt to achieve a target level of sales, and this could increase violence. Moreover, if cartels cannot perfectly observe seizures, they may confound shortages with wrongdoing on behalf of other cartels or their members, and this could potentially trigger cycles of violence. 
